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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Introduction 
In July 2004, the Essential Services Commission (ESC) decided to mandate the rollout of 
interval meters for all electricity customers in Victoria (Essential Services Commission 2004). 
The Victorian Government has since undertaken investigations into the costs and benefits of 
an accelerated rollout of advanced meters equipped with communication capability. It has 
deferred the rollout of interval meters while these investigations are ongoing. As part of the 
investigations, the Victorian Government has agreed to fund interval meter technology trials 
and pricing experiments. These trials are due to commence in the final quarter of 2006, will 
run for six to nine months and will involve 1,000 households. The intention is that advanced 
interval meters will be rolled out from 2008. 
This Discussion Paper considers consumer issues raised by the proposed metering and 
pricing trials. Its objectives are to: 
• Review and document issues arising for small consumers from proposed interval 
metering trials and pricing experiments in Victoria 
• Provide consumer advocates with a credible resource on these issues for use in 
advocacy work 
• Draw attention to the social and equity-related issues that need to be considered in a 
comprehensive analysis of costs and benefits associated with interval meter rollouts 
• Discuss approaches to trial design and other social policy responses that will help to 
address identified consumer issues. 
Social Justice in Electricity Markets 
Electricity is an essential service and governments have a responsibility to ensure universal, 
affordable access to electricity. Further, from a social justice perspective, the burden of 
providing universal electricity supply should be shared fairly across society. In a privatised 
electricity market, this means that governments may need to use their regulatory powers to 
protect the public interest. 
The most obvious way in which access to electricity may be threatened is when a household 
is experiencing financial hardship and has trouble paying their bill. This situation is more 
likely to occur in low-income households or households experiencing some other kind of 
disadvantage. Interval meter trials and pricing experiments, and any subsequent rollout of 
interval meters, have the potential to increase financial hardship for these customer groups. 
It is essential that the trials collect all necessary information on the social impacts of interval 
meters and alternative tariffs for all customer groups. 
From a social justice perspective, it is also important to note that households differ in their 
ability to respond to the price signals provided by interval meters and dynamic tariffs. 
Typically, households that are experiencing disadvantage have the least discretionary 
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demand and are least able to respond to price signals. Disparities in the ability to respond to 
price signals are of concern because they raise the possibility of increases in relative 
hardship – the gap between the rich and the poor – even though absolute hardship is 
unchanged. There is a risk that the price signals made possible through interval metering 
will make the rich richer and the poor poorer. These issues are considered in more detail 
throughout the Discussion Paper. 
Interval Metering Technology 
Interval meters are meters that can record electricity usage over a short interval of time, 
typically half an hour, allowing construction of a customer load profile. Interval meters can 
be equipped with two-way communications, allowing utilities to read meters remotely, 
confirm a particular demand response by a customer, remotely manage load, send electronic 
bills, offer dynamic pricing structures and remotely connect or disconnect supply. Interval 
meters can also be linked to in-house displays that provide customers with price signals, 
consumption data and other information. 
In most cases, the interval meter and the technology used to communicate with the utility 
will be essentially invisible to consumers, just as current accumulation meters are invisible 
or ignored. However, the quality of the visible component of the technology – the customer 
interface – will be very important to consumers. If customers are expected to respond to 
dynamic price signals, it is critical that these signals are clearly communicated. Complicated 
tariff structures that are not supported by in-house displays will make it difficult for 
consumers to respond to price signals. There is strong evidence that greater demand 
reductions can be achieved when in-house displays are provided. However, the benefits of 
providing in-house displays need to be weighed against the costs to consumers. Trials 
should aim to provide data to support cost-benefit analysis of in-house displays. 
Remote load control, in which utilities briefly switch off appliances such as air conditioners, 
raises some specific issues for consumers. Some consumers see the technology as an 
invasion of privacy or are concerned that use of the technology will interfere with their 
comfort and lifestyle. For this reason, it is important that any trials of this technology are 
voluntary and that the technology is implemented in a way that avoids significant impacts 
on comfort or lifestyle. 
Dynamic Pricing 
Interval meters support the implementation of dynamic pricing structures in which the price 
of electricity varies with time. Types of dynamic pricing include: 
• Time-of-use pricing, in which the day is divided into time bands and different prices 
are charged during each time band 
• Seasonal time-of-use pricing, in which a different time-of-use pricing structure 
applies at different times of year to reflect differing costs of supply 
• Critical peak pricing, in which customers pay significantly higher prices during a 
small number of critical peak periods that are only known up to a day in advance 
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• Real time pricing, in which electricity prices change constantly to reflect the 
underlying cost of electricity supply 
• Interruptible tariffs, in which customers receive a discount for allowing utilities to 
remotely control elements of their load 
• Curtailable tariffs, in which customers are offered a discount if they are able to 
reduce their demand below an agreed threshold. 
For those consumers that are currently cross-subsidising consumers with high peak 
demand, dynamic pricing should result in lower bills. Some consumers that currently have 
high peak demand will also be able to manage their energy demand so that they receive 
savings on their annual energy bills. However, other customers will have little scope to 
reduce demand in peak periods. Dynamic tariffs penalise those households that have little 
or no discretionary energy consumption, leading to unavoidable bill increases for those 
households. Low-income and disadvantaged consumers tend to have the least discretionary 
electricity demand and are the least able to respond effectively to dynamic price signals. 
Dynamic tariffs need to remain voluntary so that customer groups that are likely to be 
negatively impacted can retain the option of a flat, regulated tariff under a deemed or 
standing contract. This approach will deliver peak reductions from those customers that are 
most able, without imposing hardship on particular customer groups, particularly those 
experiencing disadvantage. 
Previous Trials 
The Discussion Paper reviews trials of interval metering and dynamic pricing by Country 
Energy, Integral Energy, Energy Australia and ETSA Utilities. The general impression from 
this review of metering and pricing trials in Australia is that utilities are very aware of 
possible negative impacts on consumers and have adopted appropriate measures to limit 
any impacts. First, the trials are voluntary and there are no penalties for opting out of the 
trial. Second, participants often receive incentive payments that offset any increases in bills. 
Third, some trials have excluded customers with payment difficulties so that there is no risk 
that these customers will experience an increase in hardship. Fourth, meters and associated 
equipment (including in-house displays) are provided at no cost to the customer. Finally, 
tariffs seem to have been set so that most customers will experience only small increases in 
bills even if they do not change their behaviour. These measures are appropriate for trials 
and should be adopted in the Victorian trials. 
Trial Design: Addressing Consumer Issues 
Findings and recommendations relevant to trial design are briefly summarised below. 
Tariff and technology options 
• There would be value in trialling all dynamic tariff types other than real time pricing, 
however curtailable and interruptible tariffs and critical peak pricing (with an in-
house display) seem most likely to deliver customer benefits 
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• As there is still some uncertainty about the value of in-house displays, it would be 
appropriate to design the trials to provide additional data on this issue 
• Whatever the combinations of technology and tariff chosen, there should be a clear 
commitment that interval meter trials and pricing experiments should not increase 
financial hardship and new tariff structures should not be implemented in a way that 
increases financial hardship 
• Simplicity in the design of tariffs is also critical – asking consumers to respond to 
complex seasonal TOU tariffs with multiple parts and seasonal changes may be 
asking too much 
• Dynamic tariffs should not be used as an opportunity to further increase fixed 
charges at the expense of variable usage charges. 
Participant recruitment 
• Participation in smart meter and dynamic pricing trials must remain voluntary to 
minimise the risk of negative consumer impacts, however this means that the 
benefits will be overestimated (as participants that would not benefit will not 
participate) 
• Self-selection cannot be avoided in a voluntary study, however, by randomly 
contacting potential participants and recruiting participants to match a 
representative demographic profile, self-selection can be minimised 
• Potential participants must be fully informed of any potential harm they might 
experience as a result of participation in the trial, including the potential for higher 
bills 
• Rules for opting out or having bills recalculated based on a regulated tariff need to 
be established prior to the trial and fully explained to participants. 
Participation rules 
• Participation should be voluntary 
• Participants should have the right to opt out of the trial at any time without penalty, 
at which time they can revert to their previous contract, a standing contract or 
negotiate a new market contract with a retailer of their choice 
• The Victorian Government should consider a rule under which participants that 
receive a high bill and decide to opt out of the trial would have the option of having 
their bill recalculated based on their previous tariff 
Incentive payments 
• Incentive payments mute the price signal delivered through dynamic pricing by 
insulating customers from higher bills and may reduce the observed demand 
response 
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• While it may be appropriate to use incentive payments in the Victorian trials, the 
Victorian Government could also consider non-financial incentives, such as free 
energy audits and energy efficiency retrofits 
• If bill credits are to be provided as an incentive for participation, they should be 
delivered as a credit on each bill during the trial period 
• For maximum consumer benefit, the trials could provide higher bill credits for 
summer and winter bills (relative to spring and autumn bills) as these are the times 
of year when bills are likely to be higher. 
Communication with participants 
• Ethical research practice requires that participants are fully informed of any potential 
harm to them from participation in the research, which means that all customers, but 
particularly those experiencing disadvantage, need to be fully informed of any 
potential increases to their bills as a result of the trials 
• Ideally, there should be a dedicated telephone number that participants can call to 
ask questions or provide feedback at any time 
• Brochures used to communicate trial details need to be easy to understand 
• For TOU tariff trials without an in-house display, a fridge magnet showing the tariff 
structure would be very useful. 
• For CPP trials, it is critical that customers receive notification of critical peak events 
via multiple forms of communication, including telephone calls, SMS, email and 
notification on an in-house display. 
Issues for disadvantaged customers 
• Low-income and disadvantaged customers are the most likely to experience negative 
impacts from smart meter and dynamic tariff trials, as well as the wider rollout 
• However, some of these customers may benefit from dynamic tariffs 
• Rather than exclude these customers from trials, the Victorian Government should 
specifically examine the impacts on these customers and look at ways that dynamic 
tariffs can assist them 
• Disadvantaged customers participating in tariff trials will likely need extra 
protections to ensure that they do not experience increased hardship, which could 
potentially be managed by setting up a separate customer sample designed to 
provide representation of the different categories of disadvantage and operating 
under different rules. 
• The Victorian Government might also consider trialling some socially sensitive, non-
dynamic tariffs for disadvantaged customers. 
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Social research 
• To fully understand the social impact of smart metering and dynamic tariffs, trials 
need to assess how benefits and costs vary across different customer groups and, 
where disadvantaged customers are included in a trial, explore in detail the issues 
that arise for these customers 
• There is a need for qualitative social research with participants, through surveys, 
interviews or focus groups, to document participant experiences during the trial and 
investigate how their satisfaction with the trial would change under the differing 
conditions of a full rollout. 
Knowledge sharing 
• The decision by the Victorian Government to coordinate Victorian trials presents a 
strong opportunity to ensure that the design of the trials is transparent and that 
knowledge generated is publicly available, which is an appropriate role for 
government in a competitive electricity market. 
Conclusions 
Smart metering technology and dynamic electricity pricing have the potential to enhance the 
economic and environmental sustainability of electricity supply. The intention of this 
Discussion Paper is not to create barriers to the introduction of smart metering and dynamic 
electricity pricing. Rather, it seeks to ensure that the social dimension of sustainability is 
given due consideration alongside economic and environmental considerations. Metering 
and pricing trials need to be implemented in a socially sensitive way, taking into account the 
diverse circumstances of Victorian domestic consumers. Further, these trials need to collect 
sufficient information to give confidence that the wider rollout of meters and dynamic tariffs 
can be managed to avoid increases in financial hardship. 
From our review of previous and current trials in Australia, it appears that utilities are very 
sensitive to the possible social impacts of the trials and have taken appropriate steps to limit 
these impacts. The Victorian Government has the opportunity to draw on this previous 
experience when coordinating trials in Victoria. Ensuring that the trials provide the 
necessary information to draw conclusions about wider social impacts (and ways to address 
them) is more difficult. In a wider rollout, there will inevitably be winners and losers if 
cross-subsidies are to be removed and the utility is to maintain its revenue. Identifying who 
will lose from these tariffs is difficult using the distorted sample from a voluntary trial. 
Separate trials for disadvantaged customers will help to ensure that the specific impacts 
experienced by these vulnerable consumers are given adequate attention. Expansion of the 
scope of social research associated with the trials will also increase the value of the trials as 
an input to social impact assessment of the wider rollout. 
One way to limit the wider social impacts of dynamic tariffs is to ensure that these tariffs 
remain voluntary. However, a better approach might be to give disadvantaged households 
the support they need to take advantage of dynamic pricing, through concessions, customer 
safety net provisions, targeted retrofits and other measures. If retail competition is to bring 
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benefits to all consumers, then ways to safely bring disadvantaged customers into the 
market need to be identified. 
Finally, it is important to be cautious about what can actually be achieved through use of 
price signals. Electricity is an essential service and demand for electricity is inelastic. It is 
likely that equivalent or better reductions in demand can be achieved using non-price 
measures, such as regulation to improve energy efficiency, targeted retrofits for 
disadvantaged households and subsidies for energy efficient equipment and distributed 
energy. These measures would have fewer negative impacts for consumers and would be 
more likely to deliver greenhouse gas reductions alongside reductions in peak demand. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This Discussion Paper, prepared by the Institute for Sustainable Futures (ISF) at the 
University of Technology, Sydney (UTS), explores consumer issues associated with interval 
meter technology trials and pricing experiments currently planned for Victoria’s electricity 
sector. Section 1.1 provides background on the decisions and processes that have led to the 
planned trials. Section 1.2 discusses the objectives of the Discussion Paper. Section 1.3 briefly 
outlines the approach used to develop the Discussion paper. Section 1.4 summarises the 
structure of the Discussion Paper. 
1.1 Background 
In July 2004, the Essential Services Commission (ESC) decided to mandate the rollout of 
interval meters for all electricity customers in Victoria (Essential Services Commission 2004). 
An interval meter is a particular type of electricity meter that records electricity 
consumption in real time (e.g. every half hour). When real time information on electricity 
consumption is available, electricity retailers and network businesses can charge different 
rates for electricity delivered at different times of day or year. If higher prices are charged at 
peak times, consumers may respond by shifting their consumption away from these periods. 
This is an attractive prospect for policy makers, regulators and utility businesses because it 
reduces the investment in electricity network infrastructure required to cope with peak 
demand. 
In its Final Decision, the ESC noted that interval meters would deliver better price signals to 
consumers and support cost-reflective pricing of electricity. It concluded that ‘a rollout of 
interval meters would improve the competitiveness and efficiency of the electricity market 
in Victoria and thereby contribute future net economic benefits to electricity customers and 
to the economy generally’ (Essential Services Commission 2004, pp., p.1). The rollout of 
interval meters to residential customers was to occur progressively, on the following basis: 
• Interval meters to be installed by 2011 for all large residential customers (those 
consuming less than 160 MWh per year but more than 20 MWh per year) with off-
peak metering or three-phase metering, with new and replacement installation 
commencing in 2006 
• Interval meters to be installed by 2013 for all residential customers (those consuming 
less than 20 MWh per year) with off-peak metering or three-phase metering, with 
new and replacement installation commencing in 2006 
• Interval meters to be installed on a new and replacement basis for all residential 
customers with single-phase, non-off-peak metering, with installation commencing 
in 2008. 
The ESC based its decision on an assessment that the benefits of an Interval Meter Roll-Out 
(IMRO) would exceed the costs. 
The ESC’s decision did not require any communications equipment to be installed as part of 
the interval meter rollout. If there is no way to communicate real time consumption data, 
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many of the potential benefits of interval metering will be lost. Therefore, the Victorian 
Government commissioned a specific study to investigate the costs and benefits of including 
communications technology as part of the IMRO (CRA International 2005). The study also 
investigated the costs and benefits of accelerating the IMRO. 
The study found that an accelerated IMRO, using any one of three communications 
technologies, would have net benefits over the IMRO proposed by the ESC (CRA 
International 2005). It recommended deferral of the commencement of the ESC’s IMRO to 
allow further development of a proposal for an Advanced Interval Meter Roll-Out 
(AIMRO). It also recommended that the Victorian Government coordinate technology trials 
and pricing experiments. The role of the technology trials is to confirm that particular 
technologies meet requirements for advanced metering in urban and rural areas and to 
improve understanding of any performance or operational issues. The role of the pricing 
experiments is to estimate the potential magnitude of electricity demand reduction 
associated with different tariff structures. 
The Victorian Government has since agreed to fund interval meter technology trials and 
pricing experiments. It has established a Strategy Group to oversee the trials with 
membership from the ESC, Department of Infrastructure, industry and the Consumer 
Utilities Advocacy Centre (CUAC). Trials are due to commence in the final quarter of 2006, 
will run for six to nine months and will involve 1,000 households. The intention is that 
advanced interval meters will be rolled out from 2008. 
Interval meter technology trials and pricing experiments raise numerous questions for 
Victorian utility consumers. How will trial participants be selected? Will they have the 
opportunity to opt out of a trial? Will there be financial incentives for participation? Will 
participants receive higher overall bills if they are unable to shift consumption away from 
peak periods? What types of metering interface best meet the needs of small consumers? Do 
participants fully understand the trial tariff structures? Will the trials collect all of the 
information required to fully assess all costs and benefits to small consumers? 
This Discussion Paper considers these and other consumer issues raised by the proposed 
metering and pricing trials. It will assist the consumer advocacy organisations that are 
engaging with this issue to understand the possible consumer issues and social impacts 
raised by the trials, and to devise social policy responses. In addition, it offers advice on how 
to design and implement the trials so that consumer interests are taken into account. 
While this Discussion Paper is focused on the Victorian situation, the issues considered here 
have broader relevance, given the decision by the Council of Australian Governments in 
February 2006 to pursue rollout of interval meters across Australia. The caveat on this 
decision is that the benefits must outweigh the costs for residential customers. This 
Discussion Paper will consider the social costs and benefits of interval metering for 
residential customers, providing valuable input into the debate on interval metering in other 
jurisdictions. 
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1.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this Discussion Paper are to: 
• Review and document issues arising for small consumers from proposed interval 
metering trials and pricing experiments in Victoria 
• Provide consumer advocates with a credible resource on these issues for use in 
advocacy work 
• Draw attention to the social and equity-related issues that need to be considered in a 
comprehensive analysis of costs and benefits associated with interval meter rollouts 
• Discuss approaches to trial design and other social policy responses that will help to 
address identified consumer issues. 
1.3 Approach 
To develop this Discussion Paper, the ISF drew on relevant reports and other literature 
related to interval meter trials, tariff design and social justice in electricity markets. A full 
bibliography is provided in Section 8.  
In addition, ISF conducted a small number of interviews. We spoke to consumer advocates 
as well as utility representatives that had experience with interval meter trials and pricing 
experiments in Australia. Interview participants are listed under the Acknowledgements in 
the front of the Discussion Paper. 
1.4 Structure of the Discussion Paper 
The Discussion Paper is structured as follows: 
• Section 2 explores the idea of social justice in electricity markets to provide a 
foundation for identifying consumer issues associated with interval meter trials and 
pricing experiments 
• Section 3 provides more detail on interval metering technology, associated 
communication technologies and customer interfaces 
• Section 4 reviews the various forms of dynamic pricing that become available once 
interval meters are installed and identifies consumer issues associated with each 
• Section 5 discusses some of the previous and current interval meter trials in Australia 
and consumer issues that have emerged from these trials 
• Section 6 provides advice on how to design interval meter and dynamic tariff trials 
to address the consumer issues raised in the Discussion Paper 
• Section 7 presents final conclusions. 
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2 SOCIAL JUSTICE IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
It is widely recognised that energy is an essential service. Energy provides space heating 
and cooling to keep our homes at a liveable temperature; it provides hot water, refrigeration 
and cooking facilities to help people maintain basic hygiene and health; and it provides 
lighting to increase safety. In addition, access to energy meets important social needs; it 
supports economic and social exchange and helps individuals to participate in broader 
society. The Bracks Government sees access to energy as ‘a prerequisite to social 
participation and adequate standards of living’ (Department of Infrastructure 2006, pp., p.1). 
While electricity is not the only available source of energy, it is essential for powering 
refrigeration, lighting, appliances and equipment, and is the only readily available energy 
source for homes that do not have access to natural gas. Access to electricity is essential in a 
modern society. 
Because electricity is an essential service, governments have a responsibility to ensure 
universal, affordable access to electricity. Further, from a social justice perspective, the 
burden of providing universal electricity supply should be shared fairly across society. In a 
privatised electricity market, this means that governments may need to use their regulatory 
powers to protect the public interest. 
The most obvious way in which access to electricity may be threatened is when a household 
is experiencing financial hardship and has trouble paying their bill. This situation is more 
likely to occur in low-income households or households experiencing some other kind of 
disadvantage, where: 
Persons [are] seen as disadvantaged when their life circumstances [prevent] them from 
participating fully in community life. These people may include those with a disability, mental 
illness or substance dependency, in poverty, the unemployed, the homeless, Indigenous 
[people], older persons and those with carer responsibilities (ACT Government 2003, pp., p.3). 
Just as disadvantage prevents people from participating fully in community life, so it can 
prevent them from participating fully in electricity markets. 
In March 2005, the Victorian Government established a Committee of Inquiry into Financial 
Hardship of Energy Consumers. The Inquiry Report (Committee of Inquiry into the 
Financial Hardship of Energy Consumers 2005) and a subsequent Bracks Government Policy 
Statement (Department of Infrastructure 2006) establish a process for addressing consumer 
hardship and preventing disconnection from supply. It is not the purpose of this Discussion 
Paper to assess the adequacy of this process. Instead, this Discussion Paper will consider the 
specific question of whether interval meter trials and pricing experiments have the potential 
to increase financial hardship for some customer groups. 
Of course, it is not only the trials that may have the potential to increase hardship; the 
subsequent roll-out may also create hardship. From a social justice perspective, it is essential 
that the trials collect all necessary information on the social impacts of interval meters and 
alternative tariffs to support comprehensive social impact assessment (Dufty 2005). 
Otherwise, it will not be possible to ensure that the costs and benefits of an AIMRO are 
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shared fairly across all consumers. This means that technology trials and pricing 
experiments need to include a representative sample of Victorians. If the sample does not 
include representatives from particular groups experiencing disadvantage, the findings may 
exclude important negative impacts experienced by those groups. However, the inclusion of 
disadvantaged groups in trials, potentially exposing them to higher electricity bills, raises 
ethical issues. These issues are considered in more detail in Section 6. 
The rationale for interval metering and dynamic tariffs is that they offer a way to introduce 
customers to price signals that better reflect the real cost of electricity supply. However, 
customers differ in their need, desire and ability to respond to price signals. One of the key 
differences relates to the customer’s discretionary demand. Discretionary demand is non-
essential demand that can be easily curtailed or shifted to another time. Some households 
have a lot of discretionary demand because they have a lot of appliances, use electricity for 
leisure and lifestyle pursuits or have flexibility in the times when they use electricity. Other 
households have little discretionary use because they can only afford to use electricity for 
essential purposes and are constrained in the times when they use electricity. 
Given this background, it is possible to identify customer groups that will have very 
different responses to price signals. For example: 
• Households with high income and high levels of consumption will generally have 
high levels of discretionary demand. These households are most able to respond to 
price signals but have the least need to do so, as they can easily afford to pay higher 
bills. 
• Large families, tenants, households with low income, households with members that 
are not participating in the workforce or work irregular hours, and other households 
experiencing disadvantage will generally have low levels of discretionary demand. 
These households are the least able to respond to price signals because, for example, 
they lack the capital to upgrade housing stock or appliances, are subject to time 
constraints that force them to consume in peak times or have cultural reasons for 
consuming electricity at particular times. However, these households have the most 
pressing need to reduce their electricity bills. 
• Middle-income households are the most likely to respond to price signals as they 
have an appropriate balance of ability to respond and financial incentive to respond. 
Disparities in the ability to respond to price signals are of concern because they raise the 
possibility of increases in relative hardship – the gap between the rich and the poor – even 
though absolute hardship is unchanged. There is a risk that the price signals made possible 
through interval metering will make the rich richer and the poor poorer. 
Given this context, there is a clear need to consider ethics and social justice in trial design. At 
the very least, the trials should seek to avoid increases in absolute or relative hardship for 
participants. This means paying close attention to tariff design, participant recruitment 
methods, rules and incentives for participation and communication. These issues are 
considered in more detail in Section 6, following reviews of the available technologies and 
tariffs and a summary of lessons from previous or ongoing trials in Australia. 
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3 INTERVAL METERING TECHNOLOGY 
As noted in Section 1.1, interval meters are electricity meters that record consumption over 
short periods of time (typically every 30 minutes), allowing construction of a customer load 
profile. When combined with communication technologies, interval meters are often 
referred to as smart meters. According to the Bayard Group, the global growth in smart 
metering is linked to four factors: 
• Increasingly common supply and network constraints in electricity systems 
• The development of new, cost-competitive, digital technologies 
• The introduction of liberalised, competitive energy markets 
• Growing concern about environmental protection (Bayard Group 2006). 
It is interesting that the Bayard Group does not list consumer need as one of the drivers for 
the growth in smart metering. While some consumers may be interested in having more 
detailed information about their electricity consumption, many give electricity consumption 
little thought and simply pay the bill when it arrives. As consumers are not directly driving 
the introduction of advanced metering technologies, it is particularly important to identify 
possible impacts of the technology on consumers. 
The economic theory underlying the introduction of smart metering technology is that 
consumers will respond to improved price signals. Smart meters offer a way to deliver a 
price signal that changes over time, providing an improved reflection of the real cost of 
delivering electricity to a particular customer at a particular time. The specific technology 
employed influences the effectiveness of the price signal delivered to the consumer. The 
sections below consider each of the elements in the interval meter technology chain in more 
detail. 
3.1 The meter 
Traditional electricity meters are accumulation meters, based on 100-year old technology. 
They accumulate electricity usage data by recording the number of times a metal disk spins 
inside the meter box (Bayard Group 2006). They are read manually by visual inspection. 
Consumption is calculated as the difference between the new meter reading and the 
previous reading. These meters give no information about how electricity demand varies 
during the day. The customer only receives feedback on their total consumption when they 
receive their bill, which can be months after the consumption actually occurred. 
Modern interval meters are solid-state digital meters that record and store energy usage, 
demand and other parameters over short intervals of time – typically half an hour. Thus, 
interval meters can be used to determine how electricity demand varies during the day. The 
graph of electricity demand over time for a particular customer is known as their load 
profile. Using the load profile, it is possible for utilities to implement dynamic pricing 
structures in which different prices are charged for usage at different times of day. In 
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addition, consumption information can be fed back to the customer almost instantaneously, 
along with a price signal, so that they have an opportunity to modify their consumption. 
3.2 Communications 
Interval meters can be manually read by a technician who downloads the stored interval 
data from the meter. A rollout of manually read interval meters would satisfy the 
requirements of the ESC’s IMRO decision. When an interval meter is manually read, it is 
possible (at least in theory) to charge customers a tariff that varies in a known way over 
time, either during the day or seasonally. The customer does not need instantaneous 
feedback on consumption and price to respond to this type of tariff structure. However, 
some metering systems still aggregate the interval data so that it cannot be used in this way. 
Additional benefits are possible when the meter is combined with communication 
technologies. Mesh radio, power line carrier (PLC), distribution line carrier (DLC) and 
wireless (GPRS or CDMA) communication technologies can all be used to establish 
communication between the meter and the utility. Meters equipped to send data to the 
utility can be read remotely, which results in significant cost savings over manual reading. 
Remote reading also avoids one of the major problems of manual reading, which is 
obtaining access to the meter. In some systems, the data is sent to a meter reader as they 
walk or drive by the building. In others, it is sent via a fixed network to a local substation, a 
data concentrator or a central facility. 
Meters can also be equipped with two-way communications via fixed networks, so that 
information can pass from the utility to the customer, as well as from the customer to the 
utility. This technology allows utilities not only to read meters remotely but also to confirm 
a particular demand response by a customer, to remotely manage load, to send electronic 
bills, to offer dynamic pricing structures and to remotely connect or disconnect supply 
(Bayard Group 2006; CRA International 2005). According to the Demand Response and 
Advanced Metering Coalition (DRAM 2004), advanced meters should be able to transmit 
data to the utility on at least a daily basis. 
3.3 Customer interface 
Although not identified as core functionality under AIMRO, some utilities are trialling the 
use of in-house displays to provide customers with price signals, consumption data and 
other information (see Section 5). The in-house display shows information such as the 
current electricity consumption and cost, accumulated consumption and cost and the tariff 
that currently applies. Some in-house displays are equipped with tariff indicator lights, to 
show peak, off-peak, shoulder and critical peak periods. They may also be able to display 
messages from the utility. In-house displays can be integrated into the interval meter or can 
be separate units. 
Although not essential for most types of dynamic pricing, in-house displays are often used 
to support the implementation of critical peak pricing (see Section 4.3). In-house displays 
give customers the best opportunity to manage their demand by providing constant access 
to direct feedback on price and usage. A recent review of the literature on energy feedback 
found that the provision of direct feedback through in-house displays or the meter itself 
consistently delivers greater demand reductions than indirect feedback through bills or 
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other methods; the former delivered savings of 5 to 15%, the latter savings of 0 to 10% 
(Darby 2006). 
Another type of customer interface is available through the Internet. Password-protected 
interval data can be posted on the web so that customers can access information on their 
usage patterns, test the impact of their attempts to save energy and check the size of their 
bill. An example is the WebGraphs service provided by Testing and Certification Australia 
(see http://www.tcaust.com/tcaweb/tcapublishing.nsf/Content/WebGraphs). 
3.4 Remote load control 
Interval meters equipped with two-way communication can also be used to directly control 
appliances in the home. The meter can be connected to an appliance, such as an air 
conditioner or pool pump, giving the utility control over that appliance. In periods when 
demand is approaching the capacity of the network, the utility can send a signal to the 
appliance that switches it off for a short period, thereby reducing demand. Remote control 
of air conditioning load is common practice in the United States. 
3.5 Discussion 
In considering the potential consumer issues associated with interval metering technology, it 
is important to recognise a distinction between the visible and invisible components of the 
technology. In most cases, the interval meter and the technology used to communicate with 
the utility will be essentially invisible to consumers, just as current accumulation meters are 
invisible or ignored. Consumers will have little interest in the details of this technology, 
beyond its ability to empower them by providing them with more detail about their 
electricity use. 
However, the quality of the visible component of the technology – the customer interface – 
will be very important to consumers. If customers are expected to respond to dynamic price 
signals, it is critical that these signals are clearly communicated. Complicated tariff 
structures that are not supported by in-house displays will make it difficult for consumers to 
respond to price signals. As noted earlier, there is strong evidence that stronger demand 
reductions can be achieved when in-house displays are provided. 
The current generation of in-house displays, such as the Ampy Email EcoMeter, have 
prominent tariff indicator lights, graphical displays and real-time messaging to ensure that 
the consumer receives all necessary or desired information on a timely basis and in an easy 
to understand format. While these capabilities are desirable, it is important to seek a balance 
between the capability of the in-house display and the cost to consumers.  
The cost of these various technologies is perhaps the major potential issue for consumers. 
While the technology is often provided free of charge during trials, utilities will need to 
recover any additional costs during full-scale rollouts. Under the IMRO, utilities were to roll 
out 217,000 new interval meters and 777,000 replacement interval meters to all customers 
over 2006-10 at a cost of $445 million (ESC 2006). The provision of metering services to small 
customers is a prescribed service that is separately regulated by the ESC and distributors 
recover the costs through regulated metering charges. At present, the charges for manually 
read interval meters are the same as the charges for accumulation meters, which means that 
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the costs of the IMRO would be spread across all customers. Nevertheless, the IMRO does 
have additional costs, which are borne by customers. These additional costs can be 
significant for customers that are already experiencing financial hardship. 
It is not yet clear how customers would be charged for the cost of an AIMRO but a similar 
approach may be adopted. A report by CRA International (2005) found that an AIMRO 
would have net benefits under appropriate technology configurations. While the addition of 
communication technology raises the cost of metering, there are operational savings for the 
utility in addition to potential savings resulting from demand response. If these findings are 
accurate, it should be possible to deliver an AIMRO without any additional cost to the 
consumer and perhaps even at a lower cost than an IMRO. However, much depends on the 
actual approach to cost recovery and consumer advocates will need to monitor any future 
decisions on this issue. 
It is important to note that the CRA International report did not consider the cost of 
providing in-house displays. As noted above, there is evidence that in-house displays 
provide access to additional benefits for consumers and utilities. However, these benefits 
need to be weighed against the additional cost. It would be appropriate for metering trials in 
Victoria to compare the demand response achieved with and without in-house displays to 
better understand the benefits they provide to consumers and utilities. This would then 
support additional cost-benefit analysis to determine whether it is appropriate, from a 
consumer perspective, to provide in-house displays as part of an AIMRO. 
Remote load control also raises issues for consumers. Some consumers see the technology as 
an invasion of privacy or are concerned that use of the technology will interfere with their 
comfort and lifestyle. For this reason, it is important that any trials of this technology are 
voluntary and that the technology is implemented in a way that avoids significant impacts 
on comfort or lifestyle. 
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4 DYNAMIC PRICING 
As long as technology costs are kept down, the interval metering technology discussed in 
Section 3 does not, in itself, result in any significant changes for the domestic consumer. 
However, interval metering supports the implementation of dynamic pricing, where the 
price charged for electricity varies with time. According to Wellsmore (2006, pp., p.4), the 
arguments raised in favour of dynamic pricing fall into three categories: 
• Sending a ‘price signal’ to consumers to undertake demand management 
• The desirability of ending cross-subsidies between consumers with different levels of 
use or who create different costs for their providers; and 
• Improving cost-recovery by trying to match the costs of consumption with the bills 
being sent to customers. 
Each of these arguments has merit. However, it is important to consider the impacts on 
consumers associated with various types of dynamic pricing. This section reviews the major 
types of dynamic pricing that are possible in conjunction with interval metering and 
outlines their advantages and disadvantages for consumers. 
4.1 Time-of-use tariffs 
A time-of-use (TOU), or time-of-day, tariff is a type of dynamic pricing in which the day is 
divided into time bands and different prices are charged during each time band. In a basic 
TOU tariff, the day is divided into peak and off-peak periods, with a higher price charged 
during peak periods. This encourages consumers to shift their consumption out of the peak 
period and into the off-peak period, thereby reducing demand on electricity infrastructure at 
these times. 
More complicated forms of TOU tariff may identify shoulder periods between the peak and 
off-peak periods, with prices intermediate between the peak and off-peak prices. The 
identified periods may also differ on weekdays and weekends. However, to make it easy for 
consumers to remember and respond to the tariff structure, there are usually no more than 
four separate time periods defined during the day. Energetics (2003) found no evidence that 
small customers would be willing to accept pricing structures with more than two or three 
different parts. 
A TOU tariff can be implemented using a manually read interval meter with no 
communication or in-house displays. The only requirement is that consumption during each 
of the defined tariff periods can be identified in the data read from the meter. In this case, 
the customer can be informed of the tariff structure using brochures and/or web pages. At 
the other extreme, a TOU tariff could be implemented using remotely-read meters, two-way 
communication and an in-house display to inform customers of the applicable tariff. 
For many domestic consumers, TOU tariffs will already be familiar from off-peak billing for 
hot water or from telephone bills. The tariff structures are relatively easy for customers to 
Institute for Sustainable Futures, UTS                                                            July 2006 
   
Interval Meter Technology Trials and Pricing Experiments: Issues for Small Consumers  11
remember and their constancy allows customers to establish new routines to reduce 
consumption in peak times.  
TOU tariffs reduce the extent to which customers with lower demand during peak periods, 
such as those without air conditioners, are subsidising customers who have high demand 
during peak periods. From this perspective, TOU tariffs more appropriately reflect the real 
cost of supply to a particular household. However, customers that are unable to shift their 
consumption out of the peak periods, for whatever reason, may experience higher bills. This 
may be appropriate if the customer is willing and able to pay for an air-conditioned home, 
but can be problematic if the customer is a large family with little scope to shift 
consumption. 
Another concern with TOU tariffs, particularly when they are implemented without an in-
house display to remind customers of the different tariffs at different times of day, is that 
customers can receive a large initial bill if they fail to respond or understand the price 
signals. With quarterly billing, there is a delay of up to three months between electricity 
usage and the price signal provided in the bill. This means that customers can accumulate a 
large bill without realising they are doing so. For customers with cash flow problems, this 
can create financial hardship. This problem can be managed to some extent by providing an 
in-house display as a reminder of daily tariff changes or by billing more frequently (e.g. 
monthly). 
4.2 Seasonal time-of-use 
As the timing, duration and magnitude of peak periods differs from summer to winter, 
some utilities have implemented seasonal TOU tariffs to better reflect the differing seasonal 
costs of electricity supply. Usually, this means that a different TOU tariff applies at different 
times of year. The seasons may be defined in various ways, depending on the network 
objectives. Typically, there are higher prices for summer and winter peak periods and lower 
prices for spring and autumn. 
A seasonal TOU tariff has much the same advantages and disadvantages as described in 
Section 4.1. However, the tariff structure is more complex, making it more difficult for 
customers to understand, remember and respond to it. Further, the seasonal changes may 
make it more difficult for customers to establish routines that avoid consumption during 
peak periods. In addition, bills in particular seasons are likely to be higher than they are at 
present. For customers experiencing cash flow problems, these higher bills may be difficult 
to manage, even if bills are lower at other times of the year. 
4.3 Critical peak pricing 
In critical peak pricing (CPP), or dynamic peak pricing, customers pay significantly higher 
prices during a small number of ‘critical peaks’. The price for these periods is defined in 
advance but the timing of the critical peaks is not known until shortly before the event. The 
utility informs the customer of an impending critical peak using various communications 
media, including automated telephone calls, email, SMS and messages on in-house displays. 
The warning may be received as much as 24 hours before the event or as little as two hours 
before the event. The customer then has the opportunity to avoid the high prices by 
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curtailing consumption during the critical peak. There is evidence that CPP provides greater 
overall consumer benefits than TOU pricing (Faruqui & George 2002). 
Critical peaks usually have a short duration (up to four hours) and the utility usually 
commits to a maximum number of events per year, month and day. From a network 
perspective, CPP reflects the fact that there are only a small number of events each year in 
which demand approaches network capacity, usually prompted by very high or low 
temperature or market events (such as removal of generation capacity). The cost of supply 
during these times is very high, due to high costs in the wholesale electricity market and/or 
high network congestion costs. CPP sends a price signal to consumers to reflect this. For 
utilities, critical peak pricing can deliver 95% of the value of real time pricing (see Section 
4.4) while containing back office costs (Amos 2006).  
While CPP could theoretically be implemented using an interval meter with no 
communication capability, in practice it is usually implemented using an interval meter with 
two-way communications and an in-house display. The in-house display provides a way to 
deliver the message to the customer that a critical peak is impending. It gives the customer 
the best opportunity to recognise the higher price and shift their consumption. 
Outside critical peak periods, the customer pays an underlying flat tariff or TOU tariff that is 
less than the comparable tariff. This compensates the customer for the high prices during the 
critical peak. When the underlying tariff is a TOU tariff, the utility usually sets the timing of 
critical peaks to coincide with the daily peak period. 
CPP raises several issues for domestic consumers. If the customer misses the announcement 
of the critical peak or the notice of the event is short, they may not be able to shift their 
consumption and may experience significant costs. For example, if a customer set their air 
conditioner to come on at a certain time each day and missed the announcement of a critical 
peak event, they would incur a large cost. Trials to date seem to indicate that this is not a 
major problem when participation is voluntary and customers are able to choose their 
preferred communication type (see Section 5). However, voluntary participation creates a 
separate set of problems; self-selection of participants and exclusion of those participants 
that are likely to experience negative impacts means that trials will underestimate the 
negative impacts of a wider roll-out. Further, it is important that the decision to volunteer 
for a trial is based on complete and accurate information about the potential impacts. These 
issues are considered in more detail in Section 6. 
Mandatory rollout of this kind of tariff would be problematic, as some customers may have 
limited access to communication media (e.g. the Internet and mobile phones), insufficient 
understanding of the tariff (e.g. due to language problems) or little discretionary energy use. 
These customers would be penalised for their inability to respond. These problems are also 
considered in more detail in Section 6. 
4.4 Real time pricing 
In a real time pricing (RTP) situation, electricity prices change constantly to reflect the 
underlying cost of electricity supply. For example, prices might be changed every hour to 
reflect those in the wholesale electricity market, plus an underlying charge for infrastructure 
(Amos 2006). RTP requires the customer to be constantly vigilant to identify periods when 
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prices are high and reduce their demand in these periods accordingly. As such, it is best 
suited to large commercial or industrial customers with large amounts of discretionary 
demand, rather than small domestic customers. ISF is not aware of any current proposals to 
trial RTP with domestic customers, so this type of dynamic pricing is not considered further 
here. 
4.5 Interruptible and curtailable tariffs 
Interruptible tariffs are used in conjunction with the remote load control technology 
discussed in Section 3.4. As compensation to customers that agree to have their appliance 
load interrupted in some way by the utility, they receive a tariff that is discounted in some 
way compared to the standard tariff. The discount might take the form of an incentive 
payment, a rebate based on the number of times load control is used or a reduced tariff. 
Interruptible tariffs are only problematic for domestic customers if they begin to impact on 
lifestyle and comfort to a greater degree than the customer had expected. As long as these 
tariffs remain voluntary and the customer can opt out without penalty, they seem to raise 
few direct issues for consumers and ask very little of consumers. For utilities, one of the 
benefits of using interruptible tariffs is that the amount of load reduction available is known 
and does not rely on unpredictable customer behaviour.  
A curtailable tariff adopts a slightly different approach. Under this type of tariff, the utility 
offers incentive payments to customers that are able to reduce their energy use by an agreed 
amount on specified peak days. Curtailable tariffs were used in California following the 
electricity crisis in 2001. Under the 20:20 Program, customers were offered 20% discounts on 
their electricity bills for reducing their energy use by more than 20% (DRAM 2002). Under a 
curtailable tariff, it is up to the customer how they achieve the specified load reduction. This 
empowers customers to manage their load in the way that is most appropriate at the time. If, 
for some reason, they can’t achieve the specified reduction, they are not penalised. This type 
of scheme seems particularly positive for consumers. 
4.6 Discussion 
It is clear that interval metering technology makes new types of dynamic pricing possible 
that better reflect the time variation of the costs of electricity supply. For utilities, this type of 
pricing is attractive because it has the potential to trigger a demand response at times when 
the network is most likely to be constrained. This demand reduction may be sufficient to 
delay network augmentation in particular areas, resulting in significant cost savings. 
The benefits for consumers are more variable. For those consumers that are currently cross-
subsidising consumers with high peak demand, dynamic pricing should result in lower 
bills. Some consumers that currently have high peak demand will also be able to manage 
their energy demand so that they receive savings on their annual energy bills. However, 
other customers will have little scope to reduce demand in peak periods. As pointed out by 
Langmore and Dufty (2004, pp., p.4), dynamic tariffs penalise those households that have 
little or no discretionary energy consumption, leading to unavoidable bill increases for those 
households. 
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Previous work has shown that low-income and disadvantaged consumers have the least 
discretionary electricity demand and are the least likely to be able to respond effectively to 
dynamic price signals (ISF 2004). At the same time, low-income households can have high 
peak demand for reasons that are out of their control (Wellsmore 2006). Often, these 
customers live in housing stock (often rented) with poor thermal performance, equipped 
with inefficient appliances. They lack the capital to improve their energy efficiency and have 
little non-essential demand. Consequently, these customers are the most likely to experience 
negative impacts from new dynamic tariff structures. This is a concern from a social justice 
perspective. 
The variation in available benefits for domestic consumers is of less concern during pricing 
trials, as participation tends to be voluntary, most trials include incentive payments to offset 
any bill increases and there are usually no penalties for opting out. However, following 
rollout of interval meters, utilities will have an incentive to move more customers onto 
dynamic tariffs. Dynamic tariffs need to remain voluntary so that customer groups that are 
likely to be negatively impacted can retain the option of a flat, regulated tariff under a 
deemed or standing contract. This approach will deliver peak reductions from those 
customers that are most able, without imposing hardship on particular customer groups, 
particularly those experiencing disadvantage. 
A voluntary approach still has some problems. Is seems unfair that high-income households 
with large amounts of discretionary demand should have a greater opportunity to save on 
their bills than low-income households with little discretionary demand. This points to the 
importance of separate, non-price policy approaches to address social justice concerns.  
It is important to note that the potential magnitude of consumer impacts varies with the 
type of tariff structure. Interruptible and curtailable tariffs will not result in bill increases. 
For other types of dynamic pricing, the likelihood of a bill increase depends very much on 
the specific details of the tariff structure. Obviously, tariffs with very high prices at 
particular times, such as CPP and RTP, can potentially create large bills in a short period of 
time. However, although the peak prices in a TOU tariff will be significantly lower than 
those applying during critical peaks, they apply over longer periods; this means that TOU 
tariffs may have a greater total potential to create high bills. Clearly, regulators need to 
closely examine the details of particular tariff offerings to identify those that may be of 
concern. 
The complexity of some dynamic tariff offerings is also a concern. Regulators will need to 
closely scrutinise dynamic tariff offerings and the way that these are marketed to ensure that 
vulnerable customers are not locked into tariffs that they do not fully understand. 
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5 PREVIOUS TRIALS 
This section reviews interval meter trials and pricing experiments undertaken (or 
underway) in Australia to identify any consumer issues that arise and how these have been 
addressed. 
5.1 The Country Energy Home Energy Efficiency Trial 
Country Energy commenced an 18-month Home Energy Efficiency Trial in December 2004. 
The purpose of the trial was to ‘better understand [their] residential customers’ propensity 
to change their electricity consumption patterns, if provided with more information about 
their consumption and its relative cost at different times of the day and year’ (Hamilton 
2006). The trial involved 150 residential customers in the Queanbeyan and Jerrabomberra 
region, all with single-phase electricity supply. This area was chosen because it is broadly 
representative of the regional areas that Country Energy serves. It has a varied demographic 
profile, with a mix of low, medium and high incomes, different family sizes and different 
life stages. It also has a good mix of housing types, from the older homes in Queanbeyan to 
larger, newer homes in Jerrabomberra (Hamilton, 2006, pers.comm., 13 July). 
To select participants, Country Energy started with a survey to collect data on 
demographics, appliance ownership and energy usage. From more than 600 customers 
expressing an interest in participating, Country Energy randomly selected participants to 
match particular demographic profiles that covered a range of users (Hamilton & Zoi 2005). 
The use of a demographic profile was a deliberate attempt to avoid self-selection of 
customers who were already environmentally aware, such as Green Power customers. There 
was no specific attempt to include disadvantaged households in the sample. However, 
disadvantaged households would have been represented to the extent that they appear in 
the broader population of the area (Hamilton, 2006, pers.comm., 13 July). 
Participation in the trial was voluntary. Participants received an incentive payment of $40 
per quarter in an attempt to ensure that they were not penalised for their participation 
(Hamilton, 2006, pers.comm., 13 July). Participants also had the ability to opt out at any 
stage without penalty and either return to their previous pricing structure or seek a 
contestable contract with Country Energy or another retailer (Hamilton & Zoi 2005). Only 
five customers opted out during the trial. Four of these dropped out because they moved 
out of the trial area; one dropped out due to personal concerns about the trial (Hamilton, 
2006, pers.comm., 13 July). 
The technology used in the trial was provided to participants at no cost. It included: 
• An Ampy EM1212 meter with net metering capability, load profile recording and 
load control capability 
• A Powerline Interface Module with a GSM phone modem (allowing two way 
communications to the utility) and a narrowband power line carrier modem 
(allowing operation of the Home Energy Monitor from any power point in the home) 
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• A Home Energy Monitor, with LED ‘traffic lights’ showing the level of tariff and an 
LCD screen to show real time cost and consumption information (on an hourly, 
daily, weekly and monthly basis) 
• A dedicated back-office software system to manage the data. 
The meters were remotely interrogated on a regular basis to gather half hour load profile 
information. Billing was quarterly and bills provided extra information on comparative 
usage and consumption during the trial (Hamilton & Zoi 2005).  
The pricing structure used for trial participants is summarised in Table 1. It combined 
seasonal TOU pricing with critical peak pricing. Red, amber and green lights on the Home 
Energy Monitor identified the critical peak, peak and off-peak/shoulder periods 
respectively. During the trial, critical peaks were activated a maximum of 12 times per year 
in response to temperature or market events. Customers were notified by email, SMS and a 
message to the Home Energy Monitor at least two hours before the event. The critical peaks 
only occurred during the existing peak periods and are shown with a red light and audible 
signal on the Home Energy Monitor. 
Period Definition Price 
Critical peak 
(red) 
Maximum of 12 times per year with at least 2 hours 
notice 
37.74 c/kWh 
Peak (amber) Summer (Nov to Feb): 2pm to 8pm, Monday to Sunday 
Winter: (Mar to Oct): 7am to 9am and 5pm to 8pm, 
Monday to Sunday 
18.87 c/kWh 
Shoulder 
(green) 
Summer (Nov to Feb): 7am to 2pm and 8pm to 10pm, 
Monday to Friday 
Winter: (Mar to Oct): 9am to 5pm and 8pm to 10pm, 
Monday to Friday 
12.7 c/kWh 
Off peak 
(green) 
All other times 7.03 c/kWh 
Service Availability Charge 39.78 cents per 
day 
Table 1: Home Energy Efficiency Trial pricing structure. 
On average, trial participants reduced their energy use by 5% overall and by 30% in peak 
periods (Searle 2006). As a result of the incentive payments, no customers had a net negative 
impact on their bill (Hamilton, 2006, pers.comm., 13 July). However, not all participants 
would have saved on their bills in the absence of the incentive payment; savings depended 
on participant circumstances (Hamilton 2006). Country Energy reviewed the demographic 
characteristics of the customers that would not have achieved savings and did not find any 
evidence that particular groups were being disadvantaged (Hamilton, 2006, pers.comm., 13 
July). 
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Over the course of the trial, Country Energy conducted three surveys and a focus group 
with participants to obtain customer feedback. Brochures, in a question and answer format, 
were used to provide basic information to trial participants. There was also a dedicated 
number that participants could call that went through to a specific call centre where the staff 
had all been trained in details of the trial. Customer feedback was largely positive, with 
almost all participants being keen to continue to use the trial equipment and more than 80% 
welcoming or tolerating the critical peak alerts (Hamilton 2006). Interestingly, customers 
who claimed little knowledge about energy efficiency at the start claimed a high or very 
high understanding by the end (Hamilton, 2006, pers.comm., 13 July). The ‘traffic lights’ on 
the Home Energy Monitor appeared to work very well to inform customers of the different 
tariff periods (Hamilton, 2006, pers.comm., 13 July). 
Hamilton (2006) draws together lessons from the trial with relevance to consumers: 
• Proposed tariffs need to be simple, given that the typical residential customer is 
currently on a simple tariff and has little understanding of time of use pricing and 
interval metering 
• Provide simple information and set up a dedicated contact point for participants 
• Respond to customer feedback on an ongoing basis. 
Country Energy is extending the trial for six months based on customer feedback. However, 
Hamilton notes that Country Energy does not ‘believe that the cost of mandating interval 
meters will be outweighed by benefits in every case’ (Hamilton 2006). That is, there will be 
winners and losers from introduction of this technology unless additional policy initiatives 
and customer protection measures are implemented simultaneously. 
5.2 Integral Energy trials 
Integral Energy is running three trials at the moment: 
• An advanced metering trial, focused purely on the technology 
• A Seasonal Energy trial, testing the response to a seasonal TOU tariff 
• A Dynamic Peak Pricing trial, testing the response to dynamic peak pricing. 
The advanced metering trial, which is currently at the bench test stage, will trial an Echelon 
metering system that uses PLC technology to communicate interval data to a data 
concentrator and GPRS to communicate data from the concentrator to head office. Integral 
Energy sees this as a low-cost technology in situations where there is a high density of 
interval meters; it would therefore be appropriate for a full roll-out (Telford, 2006. 
pers.comm., 13 July). 
Integral Energy is currently recruiting participants for its two pricing trials in western 
Sydney. The trials are due to commence on 1 August 2006 and run for two years. The 
purpose of the trials is ‘test whether customers…are interested in reducing their electricity 
usage during the peak times when prices and the cost of supplying electricity are 
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significantly higher’ (Integral Energy 2006). The trials only involve participants in Western 
Sydney and are intended to gauge customer response across a range of temperatures 
(Telford, 2006. pers.comm., 13 July). 
For the pricing trials, the intention is to recruit a representative cross-section of Integral 
Energy customers. Consequently, Integral Energy has invited a random sample of customers 
to participate (Telford, 2006. pers.comm., 13 July). To ensure that the final sample is broadly 
representative, Integral Energy has developed participant profiles using demographic and 
consumption characteristics. These will be used to guide participant recruitment. For 
example, Integral Energy will recruit to ensure that large and small customers, low-income 
households and households with air conditioners are represented (Wellsmore, 2006, 
pers.comm., 13 June). 
Importantly, customers that have payment difficulties have been excluded from the trial. 
This is because bills are likely to be more variable under the new tariffs, with higher bills in 
summer and winter and lower bills in autumn and spring. Exclusion of customers with 
payment difficulties protects these customers from possible cash flow problems. 
The Seasonal Energy trial tests a seasonal TOU tariff with peak and off-peak prices and 
periods that vary according to the season (Wellsmore, 2006, pers.comm., 13 June). The 
proposed tariff structure for 2006-07 is summarised in Table 2. Customers on Off-Peak 1 and 
Off-Peak 2 rates for particular appliances (usually electric water heaters) continue to pay 
these rates for these appliances. With this tariff structure, it is likely that participants will 
receive lower bills in autumn and spring quarters and higher bills in winter and summer 
quarters.  
To enable charging of a seasonal tariff, Integral Energy will provide participants with 
interval meters that communicate with the utility via mobile phone technology. However, 
participants in the Seasonal Energy trial will not receive an in-house display. 
Period Period definition Tariff 
Extended Summer 
Peak 
1pm to 8pm (working days) between 1 November 
and 31 March inclusive 
30.3996 c/kWh 
Winter Peak 5pm to 7pm (working days) between 1 June and 31 
August inclusive 
30.3996 c/kWh 
Off-Peak All other times of the year 9.7449 c/kWh 
Access charge 38.87664 cents 
per day 
Table 2: Integral Energy proposed seasonal time of use tariff structure. 
The second pricing trial tests dynamic peak pricing, with an underlying TOU tariff. The 
tariff structure is summarised in Table 3. Dynamic peak pricing events will occur at fixed 
times (1pm to 8pm) on 12 working days each year during the trial period. Under this tariff, 
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customers pay less for their electricity for 99% of the time, but significantly more during 
dynamic peaks. 
Period Definition Tariff 
Dynamic peak 1pm to 8pm, working days; 12 days per 
year 
167.0306 c/kWh 
Shoulder 
period 
1pm to 8pm, all other working days 10.7646 c/kWh 
Off-peak All other times 8.3204 c/kWh 
Access charge 38.87664 cents per day 
Table 3: Integral Energy proposed dynamic peak pricing structure. 
Dynamic peak events will normally occur during times of high electricity demand, such as 
very hot days in summer and very cold days in winter. Integral Energy will give at least two 
hours notice of a dynamic peak event using either a phone call with a recorded voice 
message, an SMS or an email. Customers may nominate which form of communication they 
would prefer, and can nominate all three. 
To implement dynamic peak pricing, Integral Energy will install an interval meter with two-
way communications and an in-home display unit called an Energy Monitor, similar to that 
used in the Country Energy trial (see Section 5.1). 
Participants in both trials will be eligible for two incentive payments. The first is an up-front 
joining bonus of $100 for customers who decide to participate, paid as a credit on their bill. 
The second is a $200 completion bonus credited to participants that complete the full two-
year trial. Participants can withdraw from the trial at any time and revert to the standard 
default tariff; they would then be ineligible for the $200 payment (Wellsmore, 2006, 
pers.comm., 13 June). 
Integral Energy has examined a sample of customers to see what impact the trial tariffs 
would have on their bills if they ignored the price signals and continued to consume in the 
same way as before the trial. After inclusion of the incentive payments, they believe that 
most, but not all, customers would receive a lower annual bill even if they did not respond 
to the price signals (Wellsmore, 2006, pers.comm., 13 June).  
Integral Energy has provided potential participants with brochures providing details of the 
trial and tariffs. There is also a dedicated telephone number that participants can call if they 
have questions or wish to opt out of the trial. The methods used to collect customer feedback 
during the trial are yet to be determined. 
5.3 EnergyAustralia initiatives 
EnergyAustralia is currently rolling out smart meters to residential customers across its 
network on a new and replacement basis, as well as to all customers that consume more 
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than 15 MWh per year. It estimates that it is installing about 50,000 interval meters each 
year. The meters are being used to support a TOU tariff structure called PowerSmart. The 
tariff structure is summarised in Table 4. For customers that choose this tariff, a new interval 
meter is installed free of charge if one is not in place. There is no in-house display and the 
tariff can be implemented without advanced communications capabilities. 
Period Definition Tariff 
Peak 2pm to 8pm weekdays 24.75 cents/kWh 
Shoulder 
period 
7am to 2pm and 8pm to 10pm weekdays 
7am to 10pm weekends and public holidays 
9.0085 cents/kWh 
Off-peak 10pm to 7am every day 5.3485 cents/kWh 
Service availability charge 36.3 cents per day 
Table 4: EnergyAustralia’s PowerSmart tariff structure. 
EnergyAustralia surveyed the bills of 3,000 residential PowerSmart customers and found 
that 94% have received bills that were the same or cheaper as what they would have paid 
under standard flat tariffs. Customers saved an average of 10% on their bills and some 
customers saved more than 30%. Of customers that received higher bills, the increase was 
usually less than 5% (Energy Australia 2006). 
Building on this experience, EnergyAustralia is conducting a two-and-a-half year Strategic 
Pricing Study involving more than 750 residential customers. The study will test customer 
response to seasonal TOU tariffs and dynamic peak pricing to determine capital deferral 
potential. Table 5 summarises the dynamic peak pricing tariffs. 
Tariff Period Definition 
PowerAlert 
(Medium) 
PowerAlert 
(High) 
Peak Up to 12 Dynamic Peak Pricing Periods per year 
lasting from half an hour to four hours, only 
between 7am and 10pm 
100 c/kWh 200 c/kWh 
Shoulder 
period 
7am to 10pm every day 9.5 c/kWh 8.5 c/kWh 
Off-peak 10pm to 7am every day 7.5 c/kWh 6.5 c/kWh 
Service availability charge 32 cents per day 
Table 5: EnergyAustralia’s PowerAlert tariff structures. 
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Dynamic peak pricing periods will occur up to 12 times per calendar year, no more than 
four times per month and no more than once per day. Participants will be notified at least 
two hours before the event via a choice of SMS, email, telephone or the web, as well as 
through an in-house display. The timing of the dynamic peak pricing periods will reflect 
times of actual peak demand, due to very high or low temperatures or events such as the 
shutdown of a power station. Tariffs outside these periods are lower than the regulated flat 
tariffs. 
EnergyAustralia is recruiting participants at random for the Strategic Pricing Study. 
Participation is voluntary and participants may opt out at any time with no penalty. 
Participants receive incentive payments as part of the contract they sign when entering the 
trial. EnergyAustralia is using initial surveys to keep track of self-selection within the 
random sample. Initial indications are that participants are more likely than average to be 
home owners with three-phase supply and above average consumption (EnergyAustralia, 
2006, pers.comm., 17 July). 
EnergyAustralia is also undertaking an Advanced Metering Infrastructure Trial in 10,000 
homes to assess the operational savings associated with automated meter reading. The 
meters installed will have two-way communication capability and will enable real-time 
detection of power loss, more accurate meter reading and same-day remote connections and 
disconnections (EnergyAustralia 2006). This trial is purely focused on the technology and 
will involve installation of meters in low, medium and high-density applications 
(EnergyAustralia, 2006, pers.comm., 17 July). 
EnergyAustralia is also running a trial with 300 pool owners to test the take up rates of 
voluntary TOU tariffs in this customer group and to collect data on the savings these 
customers can achieve (EnergyAustralia 2006). 
5.4 AGL Retail trial in Victoria 
AGL Retail is currently conducting a two year trial in Victoria using type 5 manually read 
interval metering technology to measure the demand response to critical peak prices that are 
five times the normal peak price. Preliminary results of this trial have not indicated any 
significant change in demand (Kelly 2005). ISF was unable to contact an appropriate AGL 
representative to seek additional information on this trial in the time available for this study. 
5.5 ETSA trial of direct load control 
In 2005, ETSA Utilities was commissioned by the Essential Services Commission of South 
Australia (ESCOSA) to undertake a demand management program in South Australia. As 
part of this program, ETSA Utilities is undertaking trials of direct load control technology. 
Direct load control enables the utility to switch off air-conditioners for periods of a few 
minutes each hour on very hot days. 
ETSA Utilities is using Comverge Load Control Units (LCUs) and control software for direct 
load control. The LCUs are installed on the outside of the home, adjacent to the air-
conditioner compressor. They are remotely controlled using ETSA’s radio network. In the 
trials, the LCUs were only used to switch off air-conditioner compressors, not air-
conditioner fans (ETSA Utilities 2006b). 
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A pilot trial of the technology was undertaken on five hot days (maximum temperature 
above 34°C) in March 2006. Twenty homes were chosen to give a representative cross-
section of house type, age, lifestyle, geographic location and size and type of air conditioner 
(ETSA Utilities 2006b). In addition to the LCUs, interval meters were installed to collect data 
on load profiles for the participants. The primary aim of the pilot trial was to ‘determine 
customer perception of change in comfort levels resulting from the remote management of 
domestic air conditioners’ (ETSA Utilities 2006b, pp., p.2). None of the participants reported 
any noticeable change in temperature or comfort levels and all were happy to continue 
participating in the trial (ETSA Utilities 2006b; Searle 2006). Aggregate demand was reduced 
by about 17% (ETSA Utilities 2006b) 
Following on from the pilot trial, ETSA Utilities is planning a larger trial for summer 2006 
under the banner “Beat the Peak”. The Glenelg area has been selected for the trial because it 
is an area served by two substations that are likely to require augmentation in the next few 
years unless peak demand is reduced. The area also has high air conditioner penetration. 
The trial will involve a larger number of homes in a concentrated location, served by the 
Glenelg and Morphetville substations. The objective is to assess the impact of direct load 
control on substation and transformer load (ETSA Utilities 2006a). 
Participation for both trials is voluntary and participants receive an incentive payment of 
$100. Otherwise, there is no change to tariff arrangements and no noticeable reduction in 
energy bills. Participants are given a named contact to call if they wish to provide feedback 
or report adverse impacts or problems (ETSA Utilities 2006b). 
5.6 International experience 
There is a great deal of international experience with smart metering and dynamic pricing. 
One example is worth noting. Puget Sound Energy in the United States undertook a TOU 
pilot study with 300,000 residential and small business customers in 2001. Peak load 
reductions and customer satisfaction were initially encouraging. However, after a change in 
the price differential between the TOU tariff and the equivalent flat tariff in 2002, it was 
found that 94% of customers were paying more in their bills than they would have under 
the non time-dependent rate. The pilot was terminated before it was due for completion 
(Energetics 2003). This example raises concerns that smart metering and dynamic pricing 
will be used as a way to increase utility revenue, rather than a way of delivering consumer 
benefit.  
5.7 Discussion 
The general impression from this review of metering and pricing trials in Australia is that 
utilities are very aware of possible negative impacts on consumers and have adopted 
appropriate measures to limit any impacts. First, the trials are voluntary and there are no 
penalties for opting out of the trial. Second, participants often receive incentive payments 
that offset any increases in bills. Third, some trials have excluded customers with payment 
difficulties so that there is no risk that these customers will experience an increase in 
hardship. Fourth, meters and associated equipment (including in-house displays) are 
provided at no cost to the customer. Finally, tariffs seem to have been set so that most 
customers will experience only small increases in bills even if they do not change their 
behaviour. 
Institute for Sustainable Futures, UTS                                                            July 2006 
   
Interval Meter Technology Trials and Pricing Experiments: Issues for Small Consumers  23
These measures are appropriate for trials and should be adopted in the Victorian trials. 
However, the existing trials also raise some issues. First, the results of voluntary trials 
should not be used to support mandatory implementation of a particular tariff structure. 
The type of customers that participate in a voluntary trial will not be representative of the 
broad range of customers in the wider population. In particular, the trials to date provide 
little information about how disadvantaged households might be impacted by different 
tariff structures.  
Second, it is possible that the existing trials may underestimate customer demand response 
because price signals are muted by incentive payments. This is not to say that incentive 
payments should not be used, but that the results on demand response may be conservative 
where they are used. 
Third, the method used to deliver incentive payments can raise issues for consumers. If 
incentive payments are paid only at the start and end of the trial, participants may 
experience cash flow problems during the trial that can increase hardship. Many domestic 
customers, particularly those experiencing disadvantage, will quickly spend an upfront 
incentive payment (or spend the extra money made available through an upfront bill credit) 
rather than saving the money until they receive their bill. A payment at the end of the trial 
may come too late to compensate for higher bills during the trial. The best approach for 
consumers is likely to be one in which any incentive payments are delivered as a credit on 
each bill during the trial period, so that cash flow problems are eased at the time of bill 
delivery. 
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6 TRIAL DESIGN: ADDRESSING CONSUMER ISSUES 
Drawing on the previous sections, this section suggests ways in which consumer issues can 
be addressed through the design of smart meter and tariff trials. For the trials coordinated 
by the Victorian Government, there is an opportunity to learn from previous trials and to 
ensure that trials collect all information required to assess the costs and benefits of full-scale 
rollout. 
6.1 Tariff and technology options 
As noted in Section 3, the specific metering and communication technologies adopted in 
trials matter little to consumers. The main technological interface with the consumer is 
through the in-house display (when one is provided). The indications from trials to date are 
that customers respond well to critical peak pricing, supported by an in-house display that 
provides constant information on the applicable tariff. It is less clear whether customers 
respond well to TOU and seasonal TOU tariffs in the absence of an in-house display. The 
possibility that consumers could accumulate a larger than normal bill in the first quarter of 
TOU pricing, before they receive any real price signals, is of particular concern for low-
income and disadvantaged customers. 
Given these issues, it is possible to prioritise particular combinations of technology and tariff 
that are less likely to have negative impacts on consumers: 
• A curtailable tariff, in which customers are asked to reduce their load at particular 
times in return for a discount on their bills, has the least potential to negatively 
impact on bills. Indeed, it could have a positive impact for many customers, without 
forcing them to respond when they are unable. 
• A combination of remote load control and an interruptible tariff has no negative 
impact on bills but a small risk of negative impacts on comfort and lifestyle, 
depending on how the specific technology works. The ETSA Utilities trial found no 
negative impacts. 
• Critical peak pricing, with an in-house display, gives customers a constant reminder 
of the tariffs that apply at particular times so that they have a real opportunity to 
respond to price signals by shifting or reducing demand. It can have a negative 
impact on bills when a customer is unable or unwilling to shift demand away from 
peak and critical peak periods. However, most of the potential impact on bills occurs 
during a limited number of critical peak periods that the customer can realistically 
avoid. 
• TOU and seasonal TOU tariffs, with an in-house display, also give customers a 
constant reminder of changing tariffs so that they have a real opportunity to respond 
to price signals. Again, these tariffs can have a negative impact on bills when a 
customer is unable or unwilling to shift demand away from peak periods. Although 
the peak prices do not approach those in critical peak pricing, they apply for long 
periods throughout the year, which may increase the potential for a larger bill. 
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• TOU and seasonal TOU tariffs, without an in-house display, require customers to 
remember and understand how the tariff changes throughout the day without 
constant reminders. For some customers, this will not pose a problem. For others, 
there is potential to accumulate a large bill, particularly in the first quarter of TOU 
pricing, before an effective price signal is received in the bill. If this combination of 
tariff and technology is to be trialled, consideration should be given to increasing the 
frequency of billing (e.g. to monthly), to providing customers with some other form 
of feedback (e.g. information on the Internet) and to creative ways to remind 
customers of the tariff structure (e.g. fridge magnets). 
While the Victorian Government should consider trialling all of the above combinations of 
technology and tariff, the first three options are the most likely to deliver direct consumer 
benefits. 
As there is still some uncertainty about the value of in-house displays, it would be 
appropriate to design the trials to provide data on this issue. For a particular trial tariff, this 
would require the establishment of one trial group with in-house displays and one trial 
group without in-house displays to allow comparison of demand response and consumer 
experience. The data provided could be used to assess the costs and benefits of the provision 
of in-house displays from a consumer and utility perspective. It may be that the additional 
cost of in-house displays is offset by the greater demand response. 
Whatever the combinations of technology and tariff chosen, there should be a clear 
commitment that: 
• Interval meter trials and pricing experiments should not increase financial hardship 
• After the trials, new tariff structures should not be implemented in a way that 
increases financial hardship. 
In some of the trials conducted to date, the trial tariff was designed so that customers that 
made no attempt to respond to the price signals would experience roughly the same bills as 
they did before. This approach maximises the potential for consumers to receive benefits, 
while minimising the potential for negative impacts and may be appropriate for the 
Victorian trials. 
Simplicity in the design of tariffs is also critical. While there is some evidence that small 
consumers are willing to accept more complicated tariffs, there is also evidence that most 
consumers think they consume less than the average and that the complicated tariffs will be 
visited on other households that consume more (Wellsmore 2006). Asking consumers to 
respond to complex seasonal TOU tariffs with multiple parts and seasonal changes may be 
asking too much. 
Finally, it is important that dynamic tariffs are not used as an opportunity to further increase 
fixed charges at the expense of variable usage charges. This would have the effect of muting 
the price signals that the dynamic tariffs are trying to deliver and penalising customers with 
low consumption. 
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6.2 Participant recruitment 
Participation in smart meter and dynamic pricing trials must remain voluntary to minimise 
the risk of negative consumer impacts. However, this raises the issue of self-selection. In any 
voluntary study, there will always be a degree of self-selection, as customers that are not 
willing to participate or feel that they will not benefit can simply opt out. This means that 
the sample will always be biased towards customers that are likely to benefit. Consequently, 
the results will tend to overestimate the benefits that would be achieved if the tariff were 
rolled out to the entire community. 
Self-selection cannot be avoided in a voluntary study. However, by randomly contacting 
potential participants and recruiting participants to match a representative demographic 
profile, self-selection can be minimised. Random contacting of participants across the 
customer base will ensure that the potential pool of participants includes customers that are 
not already motivated to manage or reduce their consumption, limiting one source of self-
selection. Recruiting participants to match a demographic profile will ensure that the final 
sample is representative of the range of demographic characteristics in the customer base. 
This approach to recruitment means that potential participants will need to complete a short 
survey to allow matching to the demographic profile. 
For metering and tariff trials, the demographic profile should include not only the usual 
demographic details such as age, income, gender and educational attainment, but 
characteristics that specifically influence electricity use, such as household size, housing 
type, access to natural gas and the type of appliances installed. 
Even in a voluntary trial, there are particular ethical issues that need to be considered 
during participant recruitment. Potential participants must be fully informed of any 
potential harm they might experience as a result of participation in the trial. This means that 
the potential for higher bills must be explained to participants before they sign up. Higher 
bills are not the only possible negative impacts that participants might experience. In 
seeking to avoid high bills during peak periods, there is a risk that customers may reduce 
their consumption to dangerous levels. For example, a customer might leave their air 
conditioner off on a very hot day and experience heat stress. Consequently, rules for opting 
out or having bills recalculated based on a regulated tariff need to be established prior to the 
trial and fully explained to participants. This will reduce the risk that customers will cause 
themselves harm in trying to avoid peak prices. Participation rules are considered in more 
detail in the next section. 
6.3 Participation rules 
From the trials conducted to date, it is possible to identify some rules of participation that 
could be adopted in the Victorian trials. First, as noted above, participation should be 
voluntary. Second, participants should have the right to opt out of the trial at any time 
without penalty, at which time they can revert to their previous contract, a standing contract 
or negotiate a new market contract with a retailer of their choice. 
A third rule, not used in previous Australian trials, is worth considering. Under this rule, 
participants that receive a high bill and decide to opt out of the trial would have the option 
of having their bill recalculated based on their previous tariff. They would then be required 
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to pay the lower of the two bills. This rule is an attempt to ensure that customers that 
misjudge the benefits available to them through the trial do not experience hardship when 
they receive a high bill. It should be strongly considered for trials of TOU tariffs in which 
there is no in-house display and quarterly billing. 
If explained to participants at the start of the trial, this rule would undoubtedly mute the 
price signal delivered through the trial. However, it would help to address the ethical 
concerns raised in Section 6.2. A possible compromise that would allow for a stronger price 
signal while alleviating ethical concerns would be to monitor bills for all participants and 
compare the size of the bill to the bill that would be expected under a standard non-dynamic 
tariff. Where large bill increases are identified, participants could be informed of the option 
to have the bill recalculated. Alternatively, this rule could be used only for disadvantaged 
customers, as discussed in Section 6.6. 
6.4 Incentive payments 
Another way to address the issue discussed above is through incentive payments. Most of 
the trials reviewed used incentive payments, delivered as credits on the bill, to encourage 
participation in the trials and to ensure that customers were not worse off as a result of 
participation. The main problem with incentive payments is that they mute the price signal 
delivered through the dynamic tariff by insulating customers from higher bills. 
Consequently, they may reduce the observed demand response. In practice, most customers 
may be trying to save as much as possible, in which case the incentive payment may have no 
muting effect. 
While it may be appropriate to use incentive payments in the Victorian trials, the Victorian 
Government could also consider some more innovative approaches. For example, the rule 
discussed in Section 6.3 could be used in place of an incentive payment. This would save 
money on incentive payments, while ensuring that no customers receive higher bills than 
they would have before. 
Another possibility is to deliver non-financial incentives. For example, participants could be 
offered free energy audits and energy efficiency retrofits. This would have the added 
advantage of delivering electricity demand and usage reductions. 
If bill credits are to be provided as an incentive for participation, they should be delivered as 
a credit on each bill during the trial period. Upfront incentive payments are not sufficient to 
compensate for later cash flow problems that consumers may experience during the trial. 
For maximum consumer benefit, the trials could provide higher bill credits for summer and 
winter bills (relative to spring and autumn bills) as these are the times of year when bills are 
likely to be higher. 
6.5 Communication with participants 
Communication with participants is an important part of trial design. Ethical research 
practice requires that participants are fully informed of any potential harm to them from 
participation in the research. In interval meter trials and pricing experiments, this means 
that all customers, but particularly those experiencing disadvantage, need to be fully 
informed of any potential increases to their bills as a result of the trials. To achieve this, clear 
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communication needs to be established right from the start and maintained throughout the 
trial. 
Ideally, there should be a dedicated telephone number that participants can call to ask 
questions or provide feedback at any time. Call centre staff that will deal with these 
enquiries need to be specifically trained in the details of the trial. Brochures used to 
communicate trial details need to be easy to understand. For TOU tariff trials without an in-
house display, a fridge magnet showing the tariff structure would be very useful. 
For CPP trials, it is critical that customers receive notification of critical peak events. This 
means providing multiple forms of communication, including telephone calls, SMS, email 
and notification on an in-house display. Some customers will not have Internet or mobile 
phone access. This makes the provision of an in-house display crucial. 
6.6 Issues for disadvantaged customers 
Low-income and disadvantaged customers are the most likely to experience negative 
impacts from smart meter and dynamic tariff trials, as well as the wider rollout. However, 
some of these customers may benefit from dynamic tariffs. Certainly, low-income 
households have strong incentives to save on their bills and often have very good 
knowledge of their consumption patterns. Concerns arise when households have little or no 
discretionary demand or lack the capacity to understand or respond to dynamic tariffs. 
The Integral Energy trial excludes customers with payment difficulties. While this ensures 
no negative impact on these customers, it also excludes them from possible benefits 
(including incentive payments). In a full-scale rollout, even if dynamic tariffs remain 
voluntary, there will inevitably be disadvantaged customers that sign up for market 
contracts with dynamic tariffs. Rather than exclude these customers from trials, the 
Victorian Government should specifically examine the impacts on these customers and look 
at ways that dynamic tariffs can assist them. 
Disadvantaged customers participating in tariff trials will likely need extra protections to 
ensure that they do not experience increased hardship. This could potentially be managed 
by setting up a separate customer sample designed to provide representation of the different 
categories of disadvantage. This trial could operate under slightly different rules. For 
example, free energy audits and retrofits could be provided for these participants to assist 
them to reduce or manage their demand. Incentive payments could be higher, or there could 
be additional rules for dealing with higher than expected bills (such as the recalculation 
option discussed in Section 6.3). The intent of this separate trial would be to explore 
particular issues that arise for disadvantaged customers and to identify ways that these 
customers might benefit from market participation. Alternatively, these issues could be 
explored through social research (e.g. focus groups) rather than trial participation. 
The Victorian Government might also consider trialling some socially sensitive, non-
dynamic tariffs for disadvantaged customers. For example, EnergyAustralia has previously 
proposed a Basic Tariff, in which there is no fixed charge, only usage charges (Wellsmore 
2006). Customers would see a higher usage charge but would have greater scope to reduce 
their bill through reduced consumption. There would likely be benefits for households with 
low income and low consumption, as the access charge is a greater proportion of their total 
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bill than it is for other households. The intent of this tariff, and other socially sensitive tariffs, 
is to recognise the essential nature of electricity and ensure that basis access to electricity is 
available to all households. 
6.7 Social research 
To fully understand the social impact of smart metering and dynamic tariffs, trials need to 
collect more than basic information on demand response and customer satisfaction. Trials 
need to assess how benefits and costs vary across different customer groups and, where 
disadvantaged customers are included in a trial, explore in detail the issues that arise for 
these customers. This indicates a need for qualitative social research with participants, 
through surveys, interviews or focus groups.  
While the main focus of this research would be participant experiences during the trial, 
there would be value in broadening the scope to consider the impact of a wider rollout. A 
wider rollout will have different characteristics to a trial. For example, there may be no 
incentive payments, customers may have to pay for metering equipment and in-house 
displays and there may be penalties for opting out. Trial participants should be asked how 
their satisfaction with the trial would change in these cases. The intent is to collect sufficient 
information to allow an accurate assessment of consumer acceptance of the technology and 
tariffs in a real situation, outside the artificial construct of the trial. 
6.8 Knowledge sharing 
Utilities that have conducted trials to date are understandably protective of the intellectual 
property they have created through the trial process. However, lessons learnt through trials 
need to be shared to ensure that rollout of smart meters and dynamic tariffs occurs with the 
least pain to consumers. While mistakes will be made, it is important not to repeat them. 
The decision by the Victorian Government to coordinate Victorian trials presents a strong 
opportunity to ensure that the design of the trials is transparent and that knowledge 
generated is publicly available. This is an appropriate role for government in a competitive 
electricity market. 
Institute for Sustainable Futures, UTS                                                            July 2006 
   
Interval Meter Technology Trials and Pricing Experiments: Issues for Small Consumers  30
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Smart metering technology and dynamic electricity pricing have the potential to enhance the 
economic and environmental sustainability of electricity supply. If peak demand can be 
reduced, particularly on the handful of days when the network approaches capacity, then 
augmentation of the electricity network can be delayed, bringing significant cost savings for 
utilities (and ultimately for the consumers who pay the cost of providing the network). This 
frees up capital for other investments, such as investments to reduce the greenhouse 
intensity of electricity supply. Direct environmental benefits are also possible by delaying or 
avoiding provision of fossil fuel-fired peak generating capacity. 
The intention of this Discussion Paper is not to create barriers to the introduction of smart 
metering and dynamic electricity pricing. Rather, it seeks to ensure that the social dimension 
of sustainability is given due consideration alongside economic and environmental 
considerations. Metering and pricing trials need to be implemented in a socially sensitive 
way, taking into account the diverse circumstances of Victorian domestic consumers. 
Further, these trials need to collect sufficient information to give confidence that the wider 
rollout of meters and dynamic tariffs can be managed to avoid increases in financial 
hardship. 
From our review of previous and current trials in Australia, it appears that utilities are very 
sensitive to the possible social impacts of the trials and have taken appropriate steps to limit 
these impacts. The Victorian Government has the opportunity to draw on this previous 
experience when coordinating trials in Victoria. In general, consumer issues that arise 
during trials can be readily managed by following the suggestions in Section 6. 
Ensuring that the trials provide the necessary information to draw conclusions about wider 
social impacts (and ways to address them) is more difficult. There is evidence that 
consumers are attracted to dynamic pricing because they believe they will be able to manage 
their demand in a way that will result in bill reductions. However, in practice, consumers 
often misjudge the benefits they will receive (Wellsmore 2006). In trials, a combination of 
incentive payments and self-selection of consumers that are most likely to benefit means that 
there is usually little pain for participants. In a wider rollout, there will inevitably be 
winners and losers if cross-subsidies are to be removed and the utility is to maintain its 
revenue. Identifying who will lose from these tariffs is difficult using the distorted sample 
from a voluntary trial. 
Section 6.6 suggested undertaking separate trials for disadvantaged customers, to ensure 
that the specific impacts experienced by these vulnerable consumers are given adequate 
attention. Section 6.7 suggested expanding the scope of social research associated with the 
trials to ensure that questions relevant to a wider rollout are included. These suggestions 
will increase the value of the trials as an input to social impact assessment of the wider 
rollout. 
One way to limit the wider social impacts of dynamic tariffs is to ensure that these tariffs 
remain voluntary. That is, even when interval meters are rolled out to all customers, 
domestic customers should retain the existing customer safety net provisions that allow 
them to remain on a deemed or standing contract with a regulated tariff. This will protect 
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those consumers that, for whatever reason, are unable to respond to dynamic pricing in a 
way that will reduce or maintain the size of their bills. 
This approach is not without its problems. Most notably, as pointed out by Wellsmore (2006, 
pp., p.18), this kind of approach has ‘the potential to establish two classes of consumers’. 
Wealthy households with discretionary energy demand, access to efficient appliances and 
the ability to manage their demand will be able to access benefits through dynamic pricing. 
Large households, households with low incomes and tenants will be excluded from 
dynamic pricing and unable to access its potential benefits. Thus, the benefits go to those 
who least need them, increasing the gap between rich and poor. As Wellsmore (2006, pp., 
p.18) notes, this ‘is a bitter price to pay for the economic purity of unwinding of cross-
subsidies’. 
A better approach would give disadvantaged households the support they need to take 
advantage of dynamic pricing, through concessions, customer safety net provisions, targeted 
retrofits and other measures. If retail competition is to bring benefits to all consumers, then 
ways to safely bring disadvantaged customers into the market need to be identified. The 
pricing trial for disadvantaged customers suggested in Section 6.6 could address some of 
these issues. 
There is no doubt that, once smart meters are rolled out, utilities will have strong incentives 
to move customers onto dynamic tariffs to try and capture the network benefits of demand 
response. Regulators will need to continue to balance the economic and environmental gains 
of these tariffs against the potential for negative impacts for certain classes of consumer. In 
addition, regulators will need to closely scrutinise dynamic tariff offerings and the way that 
they are marketed to ensure that vulnerable customers are not locked into tariffs that they 
do not fully understand. 
The Victorian Government’s initiative in coordinating smart meter and pricing trials is 
commendable and provides an opportunity to collect the necessary information to assess the 
social impacts of widespread application of dynamic tariffs. Other jurisdictions should 
consider coordination of trials in the public interest; this is an appropriate role for 
government in competitive electricity markets. 
Finally, it is important to be cautious about what can actually be achieved through use of 
price signals. Electricity is an essential service and demand for electricity is inelastic 
(Langmore & Dufty 2004; Wellsmore 2006). For Australian households, a 10% price rise is 
required to bring about a 2.5% reduction in electricity demand (Langmore & Dufty 2004). It 
is likely that equivalent or better reductions in demand can be achieved using non-price 
measures, such as regulation to improve energy efficiency, targeted retrofits for 
disadvantaged households and subsidies for energy efficient equipment and distributed 
energy. These measures would have fewer negative impacts for consumers and would be 
more likely to deliver greenhouse gas reductions alongside reductions in peak demand. 
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